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SENATE

EXEC. REPORT
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# NOMINATION OF KENNETH L. ADELMAN

MARCH 14, 1983.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. PERCY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

## REPORT

together with

## MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, having considered the same, reports unfavorably thereon and recommends that the nomination not be confirmed.

### COMMITTEE ACTION

The nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was submitted by President Reagan to the Senate on January 26, 1983, and referred to the Committee on January 26, 1983. Mr. Adelman testified before the Committee on January 27, February 3, and February 24. At those hearings, the Members explored a number of significant arms controls subjects with Mr. Adelman in order to determine his qualifications for the job for which he had been nominated. The Committee met on February 16 for the initial consideration of action on the nomination.

Following discussion among the Members, it was clear that the Committee was closely split, with unfavorable action on the nomination likely if a vote was to be held. Accordingly, the Committee decided to delay final action on the nomination for one week to give the President a chance to rethink the nomination and consider withdrawing it.

At a press conference on the evening of February 16, the President made it clear that he continued to support the Adelman nomination.

At the request of Senator Cranston, the Committee heard the nominee for a third time on February 24 to question him about his negative views on arms control, as attributed to him in a 1981 article in the New York Daily News which did not come to the Committee's attention until February 16. Following the hearing, the Committee by a 8–9 vote, rejected a motion by Senator Percy to report the nomination

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favorably to the Senate. Voting for the motion were Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, and Zorinsky. Voting against the motion were Senators Mathias, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

Subsequent to this vote, the Committee, by a vote of 14 to 3, approved a motion by Senator Baker to report the nomination negatively so that the full Senate would have an opportunity to consider the nomination. Those voting for the motion were Senators Percy, Baker, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky Tsongas and Dodd. Voting against the motion were Senators Pressler, Pell, and Cranston.

### COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The Committee considered the nomination in terms of Congressional intent when it established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and set forth the duties and responsibilities of its Director and in terms of Mr. Adelman's suitability for the position. The Committee carefully assessed his background and experience, and attempted to ascertain his degree of commitment to arms control. In considering this nomination, the testimony Mr. Adelman gave the Committee, his government experience, his writings and his public statements were all taken into account.

### CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WITH RESPECT TO ACDA

When it established the Agency in 1961, the Congress clearly intended ACDA and its Director to play a unique and very important role. In its report on the legislation which resulted in the creation of ACDA, the Committee on Foreign Relations stated that its purpose was—

> to give impetus to the U.S. goals of a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.

Congress envisaged the position of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as one of the most senior in the Executive Branch, at just under the Cabinet level. It is an Executive Level Two position—the equivalent of Deputy Secretary of State or Defense. Under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (PL 87–297), Congress intended the Director, with the support of the semi-autonomous Agency, to be the focal point for the development of vigorous and responsible arms control policies, and not the spokesman for arms control decisions made elsewhere. According to the statute:

### DIRECTOR

> SEC. 22. The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. In carrying out his duties under this Act the Director shall, under the direction of the

Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this Act. He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. No person serving on active duty as a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the United States may be appointed Director.

### PAST ACHIEVEMENTS OF ACDA

Since its establishment just over twenty years ago ACDA's achievements in this regard have been impressive. There are today twenty-one bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, and in almost every instance ACDA has played a vital role in their development and successful conclusion.

Among the most important are the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which obligated the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain to conduct future nuclear tests underground, thus sparing the world from additional radioactive pollution of the earth's surface, waters and atmosphere by the parties; the 1978 Nonproliferation Treaty, which serves to prove the good faith of the more than 100 nations which have foresworn the nuclear weapons option; the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and U.S. adherence to the two protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco—which collectively banned nuclear weapons from the ocean seabed and floor, outer space, Antarctica and Latin America; the Environmental Modification Convention; the ABM Treaty, and the SALT I Interim Agreement, which encouraged nuclear stability and reinforced deterrence.

These treaties reflect the continuing consensus of the past twenty years that responsible arms control agreements are in the nation's strategic and security interest. They are a credit to Democratic and Republican Administrations alike, and to the willingness of each Administration to carry forward the work of its predecessor. They could not have been achieved without a strong commitment to arms control by successive presidents or without the astute and often painstaking efforts of highly professional ACDA directors and their competent, dedicated staffs.

Since its creation, the post of ACDA Director has been filled by such distinguished and experienced Americans as William Foster, Gerald Smith, Fred Ikle, Paul Warnke, George Seignious, Ralph Earle, and Eugene Rostow.

### MR. ADELMAN'S QUALIFICATIONS

In assessing Mr. Adelman's qualifications, the Committee weighed carefully his relevant activities and writings, and his previous experience in the field of arms control. The Committee attempted to ascertain whether he had the necessary background, experience, and understanding of the field of arms control essential for any ACDA Director. The Committee spent numerous hours in three hearings and two business meetings in a conscientious effort to decide whether Mr. Adelman is the right choice for Director.

The majority of the Committee found Mr. Adelman to be unqualified to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. Adelman has served for the past year and a half as Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. In that capacity he has coordinated the United States Delegation to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament and headed the United States Delegation to the First Committee, which deals with arms control matters.

At the United Nations, his duties involved less the development of arms control politics than their explanation and defense. Neither the Second Special Session on Disarmament nor the First Committee can be considered forums for the formulation of serious arms control policy. The First Committee engages largely in political debates.

In fact, the United Nations Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is the primary United Nations forum for arms control activities, and the U.S. delegation is headed by a different ambassador.

Furthermore, in none of the earlier periods of his government service did Mr. Adelman have responsibility directly related to arms control policy. In 1976–77, he was an assistant to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and supervised preparation of the Secretary's annual report to Congress. In 1975 he worked briefly in congressional relations at the Agency for International Development. Earlier, in 1968–72, he served with the Department of Commerce and various parts of the domestic poverty agencies. In his years of non-government employment. Mr. Adelman has been a scholar and a writer. In 1972–75 he lived and studied in Zaire, returning to the United States to complete his doctorate. In 1977–81, he was associated with the Stanford Research Institute.

Mr. Adelman asserted that he had "devoted my entire adult life" to foreign policy and national security issues, including arms control. With respect to arms control, the hearing record did not bear out this assertion.

Mr. Adelman also pointed to his writings as demonstration of his background in arms control issues. Review of the 116 articles in 52 different journals which he cited to the Committee reveal, however, that most of his published work deals with other issues such as Southern Africa. Of the relatively few that bear directly on arms control or national security, two are critiques of SALT II; two criticize the tactics used by SALT II supporters in bolstering ratification (one is a condensation of the other), one focuses on U.S. strategic policy and posture; and a number deal with issues involving U.S. allies. Mr. Aldeman asserted, "I do not think there is any scarcity of material about what I believe in on arms control." In expressing the view that his views were "clear" he mentioned having written articles on arms control in "The best journals of the United States" which he identified as: The Wall Street Journal, The American Spectator, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The New York Times, Harpers and The New Republic. Of these, his arms control articles have appeared only in the first two.

Mr. Adelman's writings suggest a greater concern with the politics of arms control than with its substance. He failed, in the hearings before the Committee, to demonstrate an understanding of the issues. Often at the first hearing, when the Committee expected Mr. Adelman to offer knowledgeable and professional judgments in response to questions, he professed either not to have thought about them or not

to have strong opinions about them; in other instances he said that he would have to look into the matter before responding, or that the matter lay outside the range of his responsibilities at the United Nations. Among the more surprising of these answers were the following:

When Senator Pell asked whether nuclear war could be limited, Mr. Adelman said, "I have no—honestly, Senator Pell, I just have no thoughts in that area, and I will tell you why. I think it would be such a time of extreme human stress and extreme conditions that I think any predictions on what leaders around the world would do in that kind of situation would just not be accurate or not be based on anything that I know." When Senator Pell asked whether the societies could survive, he replied, "So, again, I am sorry to tell you that I just have no strong opinion on that."

When Senator Helms asked him what the United States' response would be if the Soviets offered to have a verifiable elimination of nuclear weaponry altogether. Mr. Adelman responded that that thought was something "I just have never thought about in my life, and I would have to really look at that and explore it."

When Senator Cranston asked whether the Soviets are violating the terms of SALT II. Mr. Adelman said, "That is not an area I have looked into. It is not an area I am knowledgeable about at all." Senator Cranston pressed him on the question of possible Soviet cheating on SALT II and Mr. Adelman said, in effect, that one has to know exactly what the treaty requires. Asked whether he knows all that, he responded, "No, I do not, Senator."

Senator Cranston asked whether a freeze on the testing and deployment on strategic nuclear weapons is verifiable. Mr. Adelman replied, "On the testing and deployment, I do not know, Senator."

Mr. Adelman subsequently tried to remedy the impression which these statements had made on the Committee. For instance, he told Senator Pell that in any "nuclear exchange, the tendency would be toward escalation", that such exchange would be "horrendous", and that there would be no winners. He refused at both sessions to say whether either side would prevail, although he eventually agreed, in response to further questioning, that neither side could accomplish the dictionary definition of "prevail": to "gain ascendancy, win mastery, or triumph." He also attempted to justify his earlier inability to respond to Senator Helms' question about verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons by saying that he had been puzzled as to how such a goal could be accomplished in a bilateral negotiation.

On the question of SALT II and specifically whether the Soviets are adhering to its provisions, he was willing at the second session to say that no President has found the Soviets in "clear violation" of SALT, but he avoided saying whether, in his judgment, the Soviets have violated SALT.

Mr. Adelman further told Senator Sarbanes that the United States should not undercut SALT, since it sets a climate for real reductions in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START). Asked why the climate would not be improved by ratification, Mr. Adelman gave the curious answer that SALT II, a treaty of limited duration, would become the "supreme law of the land" and would set "precedents for future treaties."

Mr. Adelman refused to specify how long, in the absence of ratification, the United States should continue to adhere to the SALT II guidelines, so long as the Soviets do so. He indicated that the decision should be left to the discretion of the Executive Branch. When Senator Sarbanes asked: "To what extent do you think the President ought to be able by a commitment to a unilateral course of action, in effect, to exclude or preclude the involvement of the Congress in the very important issue of arms controls?" Mr. Adelman said he would have to turn to legal counsel for an answer.

Mr. Adelman was reluctant to speak forthrightly about the degree of his support for other arms control treaties and negotiations, despite extensive questioning by Committee Members. This was particularly notable with respect to the discontinued Anti-Satellite Weapons Talks and the yet-unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties.

Senator Pressler was concerned by the failure of the Administration to resume the bilateral United States-Soviet Anti-Satellite Weapons Talks (ASAT) initiated by the previous Administration. Mr. Adelman supported the concept of keeping anti-satellite talks in a multilateral forum, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and maintained that "there is some doubt whether such bilateral negotiation would be productive." As Senator Pressler pointed out, only the Soviet Union possesses ASAT weapons and only the United States will soon possess them. Senator Presler added: "Moreover, it seems somewhat disingenuous for the nominee to suggest that we are actively negotiating ASAT's in Geneva, when, only last summer, the United States resisted efforts to create a space arms control working group in Geneva."

Senators Percy, Pressler, Pell, Cranston and other Members have urged the Administration on numerous occasions to seek Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Mr. Adelman at first avoided offering a direct answer to questions about his own position, eventually indicating that he does not support ratification of the treaties in their present form. Consistent with the decision already taken by the Administration, he maintained that the verification provisions should be expanded. He insisted, in response to Members' questions, that this can be accomplished without renegotiation of the treaties themselves. Some Members have noted that the two treaties contain valuable and unprecedented provisions for data exchanges, and in the case of the PNE Treaty, on-site inspection, and that reopening of the verification issues, resolved to the satisfactions of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, could needlessly jeopardize the treaties. Mr. Adelman said nothing to indicate he shares those concerns.

Mr. Adelman repeatedly expressed a desire for deep reductions in nuclear arms, but had not specific suggestions for such controls or limitations. Senator Biden questioned him as to the value of arms control in small increments within a framework. Mr. Adelman said, " . . . if you ask for baby steps, then you are going to get baby steps." In the final hearing, Senator Mathias questioned him on the value of arms control steps other than deep reductions and was able to draw from Mr. Adelman agreement that prohibition of the encryption of telemetry, on-site inspection when important, exchange of

seismic data, and establishment of data bases and exchanges of information are good steps, even when not accompanied by reductions in arms. In the end, however, Members were left to wonder whether Mr. Adelman's commitment to deep reductions would merely serve to justify opposition to more modest, but still beneficial arms control agreements.

When asked about agency staffing, Mr. Adelman offered answers which did not reassure Members as to how future decisions would be made. While he denied that there would be a "house cleaning" or "purge," he made it clear that final decisions on key personnel would not be in his hands.

Apart from Mr. Adelman's position on issues, a marked change took place in his approach between the first and second hearings. At the February 16 hearing, he asserted that he had earlier been "too cautious." Senator Tsongas asked him whether anybody had advised him to change his strategy. At first Mr. Adelman indicated that the decision that he had been "too cautious" was based on media reports. When pressed as to whether he was advised to change his strategy, he said, "The general consensus was that I was too timid, that people said to be more myself. So in that sense the answer is yes, the people did advise me of that." Asked by Senator Tsongas to recall the briefings he had had the previous week, he said, "I cannot think of one briefing that I have had on any of the subjects today that have come up that I had over the last week. I reviewed the materials, like I said, last week. And like I said this morning, these are areas that I have written about and dealt with." Asked how much time he had spent with relevant officials in the past week on the hearings and confirmation, Mr. Adelman said, "Very little. Most of the time I have been reading by myself at an apartment in town." He noted that he had been out of town several days and told the Committee, "I cannot think of briefings." Following discussions with his advisors at lunch, he disclosed that he had been helped by two so-called "murder boards"—two-hour question-and-answer sessions—before the second hearing. Whatever the case, the February 16 appearance reflected extensive preparatory work during the previous week.

In sum, Mr. Adelman sought throughout the second hearing to remedy the impression created at the first hearing of lack of information, ambiguity and confusion, but with limited success. He sought to clarify his earlier responses but remained vague and evasive on a number of major issues.

The third and final hearing, held on February 24 at the request of Senator Cranston, was intended to define more precisely Mr. Adelman's views, with particular reference to statements attributed to him in a May 24, 1981, column in the New York Daily News by Mr. Kenneth Auletta. The column was brought to the Committee's attention following the second hearing as a result of a recent column by Mr. Richard Reeves drawing attention to the May 24, 1981, Auletta article. The Committee also heard from Mr. Auletta, who appeared in response to a Committee subpoena. Both witnesses testified under oath.

There were two points at issue in the hearing. First, was the Auletta article based on an interview with Mr. Adelman? And second, were the views attributed to him by Mr. Auletta indeed Mr. Adelman's?

When the Auletta article came to public attention following the second hearing, Mr. Adelman issued a statement in New York suggesting that the interview had never taken place, a contention he repeated to the Committee on February 24. His central point was:

> I have no recollection of ever granting Mr. Auletta an interview. I do recall participating in a seminar with him at the Lehrman Institute and recall seeing him several times in that forum since then.

The majority of the Members concluded that Mr. Adelman's denials did not stand up to scrutiny. Mr. Auletta produced telephone records to support his contention that the interview had taken place just prior to publication of the May 1981 article. Furthermore, when Senator Cranston established that Mr. Adelman had indeed granted Mr. Auletta an interview on December 16, 1982, Mr. Adelman replied that his earlier denial of "ever granting" an interview to Auletta was meant to refer only to the May, 1981, interview.

Mr. Adelman did not deny giving the interview. He denied remembering it and was curiously unwilling to agree that it could have occurred. Accordingly, there was absolutely no basis for the Committee to conclude that the interview had not occurred or that Mr. Auletta had fabricated six pages of detailed notes.

With respect to the accuracy of the Auletta article in attributing certain views on arms control to Mr. Adelman, the Committee focused especially on three quotations in the article:

> I can't think of any negotiations on security or weaponry that have done any good.
>
> "One reason not to rush into negotiations", Adelman continues, "is that in a democracy these negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs. The public says, "Why increase the military when we're negotiating with the Russians?"
>
> Representing a common feeling within the Reagan Administration, Adelman says the major reason to enter into arms negotiations is to placate our allies and American public opinion. "My policy would be to do it for political reasons," he says. But: "I think it's a sham."

The Committee also considered the following additional quotation attributed to Mr. Adelman, which the Reeves column cited from the same Auletta interview in answer to a question whether negotiations for political reasons would not then be deliberately disregarding European opinion:

> Yes. We should be negotiating just for political reasons. . . . I would have sent someone on Jan. 21 (1981) to Helsinki for negotiations—very low-key—and never mention it again. If anyone brings up the subject, you can say, "We have a guy over there."

In his New York statement and in testimony before the Committee, regarding the quotation attributed to him referring to arms control negotiations as a "sham", Mr. Adelman said. "I do not recall making any such statement at any time in my life." He also asserted that

"parts of those notes, widely quoted, do not reflect my views then or now. My statements, widely reported, are not consistent with my views."

Mr. Adelman said repeatedly that the views attributed to him in the article were not an accurate reflection of his views "then or now.'

He made much of the alleged inconsistencies between Mr. Auletta's notes, the pubilshed interview, and his own thoughts, but agreed, under questioning, that some of the alleged quotations are consistent with his views—for instance, with respect to deep reductions and the need for defense efforts.

In an effort to explain this inconsistency in his denial, Mr. Adelman said the denial was "very precise and accurate" in its use of the term, "widely quoted." Thus, it was determined, his precise denial was of the use of the term "sham", to describe arms control negotiations.

## CONCLUSION

The exhaustive hearings established, in our view, that Mr. Adelman is not qualified to hold the important position of ACDA Director. His interest in arms control was revealed to be more general than specific, his familiarity with the broad range of arms control issues limited, his background in twenty years' history of negotiations shallow, his approach political rather than substantive.

He consistently shied away from proposing constructive arms control initiatives, confining himself to advocacy of deep cuts and real reductions without indicating how these can be achieved or what other steps might be taken. Mr. Adelman's emphasis on deep reductions and very little else indicates, at best, a narrowly focused view of the potential value of arms control. At worst, it may mean he intends to ally himself with those who would establish impossible standards in negotiations with the anticipation of failure.

His writings on arms control seem more designed to condemn the efforts of others than to offer fresh new concepts. The few ideas he did offer were taken from articles written four years ago—ideas that were not unique at that time, having been accepted in principle by the previous Administration, and adopted by the current Administration.

His testimony confirmed suspicions that he does not regard on-going efforts to achieve mutual, verifiable arms control agreements in a number of areas as an important aspect of strategic planning, but is rather inclined to see them, first of all, as an impediment to expansion of the defense budget. He did not display the informed, coherent, professional approach to these highly complex questions that the nation needs in the Director of ACDA.

The hearings revealed that he does not understand the relative roles of Congress and the Executive Branch in arms control as he demonstrated when he said he would need to consult legal counsel on the question of whether Congress has a role in continued adherence to agreements absent ratification.

Senator Glenn made this point.

> If the Administration is serious about arms control, an excellent way to prove it would be to nominate a director of ACDA of an acceptable political outlook who also had stature and respect in the arms control and national security commu-

> nity and had a commitment to achieving strong, effective and verifiable arms control measures. From his testimony, it is clear that not even Mr. Adelman thinks of himself in such terms. He describes himself as a "contact point" for negotiations and told the Committee he would be one of many in the room when arms control decisions were made.

We deeply regret that the President chose to overlook the clear consensus of the Committee, expressed in the 15–2 vote on February 16 to delay consideration of the nomination, that Mr. Adelman's name be withdrawn in favor of a nominee with greater experience and commitment in arms control matters. There are a number of distinguished Americans whose views may differ on certain questions but who are alike in their competence and professionalism.

The President chose not to avail himself of this opportunity. As a result, concerns as to the prospects for arms control have been reinforced, rather than allayed. Such a situation benefits neither the President nor the country.

Addressing the importance of this particular nomination Senator Dodd told the Committee:

> It is simply a fact of life that from the President to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Advisor, the common denominator among them is their lack of firsthand, in-depth experience in the arms control field. Regrettably, the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to be Arms Control Director is all too consistent with this pattern.

There is a broad concern in the world about the direction of U.S. arms control efforts and disquiet at home, about the Administration's commitment to achieving responsible arms control agreements in the context of our overall strategic policy.

As Senator Mathias pointed out to the Committee:

> If the United States is to convince our own people, let alone our allies in Europe, that there is a better and a safer, and a surer way, then our spokesman on arms control must be both convinced and convincing. He must speak from expert knowledge and from conscience. His record must be consistent and credible. If not, emotion may swamp reason and sentiment may replace policy in a dangerous passage of history.

However capable and accomplished a citizen Mr. Adelman may be, we have concluded that he is not qualified, in the words of the statute, to be "the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and the President on arms control and disarmament matters" and, under the director of the Secretary of State, to have "primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters." We urge the Senate to sustain this judgment. Republicans and Democrats alike must be concerned to ensure that our nation has the leadership to carry forward the continuing efforts to achieve arms control and arms agreements that truly serve the national interests.

## MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS PERCY, BAKER, HELMS, LUGAR, KASSEBAUM, BOSCHWITZ, MURKOWSKI

By tradition and precedent, the Senate customarily honors the President's right to select high officials whom he believes can best implement his administration's policies and decisions. Only in those instances in which a nominee is found to be clearly unqualfied or unsuited for a position of special trust and responsibility should the Senate refuse to consent to the President's choice. We believe that Ambassador Adelman should be confirmed to the position of Director of the ACDA.

In this context, we believe that the scope of the Committee's inquiry into the nomination of Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) should properly have been limited to one basic question: Is Ambassador Adelman qualified to perform the responsibilities of the Director of ACDA as enumerated in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

There can be no doubt that President Reagan wants Ambassador Adelman to be the new ACDA Director. On repeated occasions in recent weeks, the President has voiced his unequivocal support for and complete confidence in Ambassador Adelman.

With respect to the nominee's qualifications, we note the impressive list of high-level bi-partisan endorsements which were communicated to the Committee during our hearings. Ambassador Kirkpatrick wrote the Chairman a letter of February 1 stating that Ambassador Adelman had done "a first class" job as her principal deputy. Secretary of State Shultz on February 15 also assured the Committee that he has absolute confidence in Ambassador Adelman's abilities. At a seminar in Boston on February 18, Dr. Eugene Rostow, the previous ACDA Director, praised Ambassador Adelman, saying he was well versed in nuclear affairs. Dr. Rostow has also indicated that in 1981 he had invited Ambassador Adelman to be his Deputy at ACDA.

Before the February 24 vote, Senator Percy advised the Committee that he had been contacted by President Ford, former Secretary of State Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Dr. Robert Goldwyn, former aide to President Ford, who worked intimately with Ambassador Adelman, and other prominent Americans who conveyed their full support for the nominee. In light of these strong recommendations from officials and former officials, many of whom have dealt directly with Ambassador Adelman in various capacities, we were disappointed that a clear majority of the members of the Committee did not share our conclusion that the nominee is fit for this position.

We believe the President considers the arms control process to be an essential element of our national security, and he has obviously determined that Ambassador Adelman will be an able and effective

advocate for that process. The President knows Ambassador Adelman personally and has worked closely with him on a number of occasions. Ambassador Adelman was a member of the President's transition team and served as his personal representative during the release of the U.S. hostages from Iran. Moreover, Ambassador Adelman was the principal American diplomat involved in our participation in the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament.

In part, the controversy over Ambassador Adelman's qualifications stemmed from the nominee's testimony at his first hearing. In his own words, he was "too cautious" in declining to offer an opinion on a range of important questions pertinent to arms control and national security. However, his testimony at the second and third hearings demonstrated a broad and comprehensive understanding of the arms control process—its history, its problems, and its future. A number of Committee Members publicly commended the nominee following these appearances.

As we understand it, a principal objection on the part of the Members who voted against the nomination concerns Ambassador Adelman's alleged lack of personal commitment to the arms control process. Clearly, if Ambassador Adelman does not believe in arms control, he should not be confirmed. Based on his testimony and extensive writings, however, we are convinced that he believes that meaningful arms control is an extremely important national objective.

Some confusion over Ambassador Adelman's position has resulted from his various criticisms of the SALT II Treaty. In this regard, however, Ambassador Adelman simply shares reservations expressed by President Reagan, Members of this Committee, and many other Americans in and out of the Administration. It is simply not accurate to interpret his criticisms of the SALT Treaties as indicating a lack of support for arms control. Indeed his strong advocacy of meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons suggests just the opposite.

As evidence of his long held belief in the importance of arms control, Ambassador Adelman's 1978 article can be cited in the Wall Street Journal entitled, "Can There Be a SALT III?" Ambassador Adelman testified that he is as comfortable today with the views expressed in the August 1978 Wall Street Journal article as he was when he wrote it. In the article, Ambassador Adelman wrote: "Technological and political forces compel a new generation of nuclear arms negotiations, one quite distinct from SALT I and SALT II in three key respects." First, Dr. Adelman recommended that rather than just limiting missile launchers and bombers, arms control must take on other destabilizing problems, such as missile accuracy, killer satellites, and increased warhead fractionalization. This is not the voice of a person who does not believe in the process of arms control.

Second, Dr. Adelman suggested that the type of weapons included in negotiations should be expanded to encompass intermediate-range nuclear systems based in Europe. In this sense, Ambassador Adelman anticipated the INF negotiations that the United States, in consultation with its NATO Allies, launched two years later. Lastly, Dr. Adelman stated that "the number of actors on the stage of nuclear arms negotations must likewise be enlarged." To the degree that our NATO Allies are closely consulted before and after each INF negotiating round, this recommendation has also been implemented.

Since 1978, Ambassador Adelman has reiterated his support for arms control in a number of writings (See e.g., "The Seven Lessons of SALT", The American Spectator, December 1979; "Rafshooning the Armageddon", Policy Review, Summer 1979; Statement of Ambassador Adelman to the U.N. First Committee, October 27, 1981, "U.S. Arms Control Objectives".) Ambassador Adelman's views in these articles may differ from those of some arms control advocates. Nevertheless they articulate a basic belief in the need for arms control, and acknowledge that past approaches to achieving real arms control are not sacrosanct and should be subject to close examination.

Therefore, based upon Ambassador Adelman's testimony to the Committee expressing his views on arms control and taking into account his published writings on arms control over the past five years, we conclude that Ambassador Adelman has a sincere belief in the need for arms control and will be an effective advocate as the ACDA Director to achieve real arms reductions.

A second objection raised during the Committee hearings involved the nominee's alleged lack of relevant job experience. Here, too, we strongly disagree with the opinion of those Senators who voted against the nomination. As previously mentioned, Ambassador Adelman came before the Committee as the second-ranking U.S. official at the U.N. As Deputy Representative, the nominee headed the U.S. delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, coordinated the U.S. delegation to the Second Special Session on Disarmament, and represented Ambassador Kirkpatrick in National Security Council meetings on START and INF.

Prior to serving at the U.N., Dr. Adelman was employed at the Departments of Defense, State and Commerce and worked as senior political analyst at the Stanford Research Institute. At the Department of Defense, he served as a Special Assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld, thereby gaining a firsthand knowledge of the national security decision-making process. In his career outside government, Dr. Adelman compiled a lengthy list of publications on foreign affairs, defense and arms control topics, including several critiques of the SALT II Treaty and the SALT process.

It is clear that Ambassador Adelman possesses the requisite experience and intellectual prowess needed for this post and shares the President's perspective on arms control policy. His experience and skill are necessary qualifications for acting as a high-level Presidential advisor, but they are not necessarily sufficient. It is equally important that the individual be known to the President and enjoy his full trust and confidence. We believe that Ambassador Adelman meets both of these criteria.

We regret that for some Members of the Committee, the vote on Ambassador Adelman's nomination became a referendum on President Reagan's overall arms control policy. We do not believe that this linkage should be established, but for those who have or may be considering the nomination by this criterion, important progress has in fact been made in arms control during the last two years. Even the last few weeks, there has been a remarkable and underappreciated sequence of positive U.S. actions.

In START, our negotiators have sucessfully drawn from the Soviets a proposal that goes well beyond the position the Soviets were

willing to take two years ago. The Soviet START proposal, which would require a 25 percent reduction in their strategic forces, offers cuts far deeper than those negotiated in SALT II and, we might add, far deeper than might be achieved were a nuclear freeze agreement to be negotiated.

In INF, the Soviets have formally indicated their willingness to dismantle at least some SS–20s where before they were insisting on keeping what they have. Vice President Bush's trip to Europe set the stage for new movement in these talks, and on February 22, President Reagan announced that the United States would accept any INF agreement that met four conditions: equality of U.S. and Soviet forces, no compensation for British and French systems, no shifting of Soviet INF systems from Europe to Asia, and effective verification.

Last month in Geneva, the United States submitted a draft treaty for the global destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities over a ten-year period. The Administration also decided last month to move ahead with the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties. President Reagan has decided that the United States should ratify these treaties as soon as a new protocol strengthening verification can be negotiated. If the Soviets agree, these negotiations can be underway in a matter of weeks.

Thus, we believe that the Administration is moving with determination to establish a constructive and stabilizing arms control framework with the Soviet Union. We are particularly pleased to know that Secretary Shultz and Deputy Secretary Dam have committed themselves to being actively involved in this paramount issue. Ambassador Adelman, backed by the able staff ffat ACDA, will thus be joining a very accomplished team.

The Auletta Article. Much attention has recently been generated by a May 24, 1981 article written by Mr. Ken Auletta of the New York Daily News entitled "Ron's foreign policy: the posturing is the policy." We do not believe that the article should be particularly relevant to Ambassador Adelman's confirmation given the numerous writings on the public record. However, we feel compelled to discuss the article because of the extensive coverage given to it.

On February 24 the Committee met a third time to receive testimony from Ambassador Adelman and from Mr. Auletta. The hearing was held at the request of Senators Pell and Cranston after they became aware of the Auletta article which purported to quote Ambassador Adelman on his arms control views. In this article, Mr. Auletta wrote that Ambassador Adelman told him that arms control negotiations with the Soviets are a "sham." Apparently, Senators Pell and Cranston believe that if Ambassador Adelman had made this statement, it somehow proved that he is not an advocate of arms control and, therefore, not qualified to serve as the ACDA Director. Simply put, we do not believe Ambassador Adelman considers arms control a "sham."

During the course of his testimony on February 24, Ambassador Adelman maintained consistently under oath that he had no recollection of having been interviewed about arms control in May 1981 by Kenneth Auletta nor of having used the word "sham" in that purported interview.

He testified that he did not learn of the existence of the Auletta article until January 23, 1983, approximately twenty-one months after its publication and that had he known of its existence when published he would have denied that the alleged quotes reflected his opinions on arms control. He specifically testified that he does not consider arms control a "sham."

Under questioning by Committee members, Mr. Auletta admitted that this same May 23, 1981 article did not quote Ambassador Adelman's full views on arms control as they were purportedly expressed to him. Mr. Auletta testified that although Ambassador Adelman had said to him twice during the purported interview that "we are willing to have a meaningful reduction in nuclear weapons," he had not included this information in the May 24, 1981 article.

Ambassador Adelman testified during the February 24 hearing that his views on arms control are well-known and have been consistent in supporting the principle of arms control. He noted that although he felt SALT II was inadequate that this should not be interpreted to mean he does not support arms control. On this point Ambassador Adelman testified: "I have written extensively that I did not think SALT II was a real arms control package that reduced weapons, that increased stability, that saved money, that were thoroughly verifiable, and that was the statement I have written, I have discussed, and I feel strongly about." He added that even Kenneth Auletta's notes of the purported May 1981 interview quote him as saying that he would be willing to "go into negotiations ready to give up a great deal—a real reduction in nuclear weapons if the Soviets are willing to."

In conclusion, we do not believe that the February 24 hearing with Ambassador Adelman and Mr. Auletta provided any grounds for reversing our earlier stated opinion that the nominee is competent and qualified and that the nomination should be confirmed by the Senate.

CHARLES H. PERCY.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
JESSE HELMS.
RICHARD G. LUGAR.
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM.
RUDY BOSCHWITZ.
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI.

## ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR EDWARD ZORINSKY

I approach the nomination of Ambassador Kenneth Adelman to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with a good measure of sympathy. As the former Mayor of Omaha, Nebraska, I understand the importance for any executive of having his choice of persons to assist him. When that executive is the President of the United States, it would seem the importance would be all the greater. However, my practice as the Mayor of Omaha—and I still believe it to be a good one—was to withdraw nominations which became embroiled in controversies. There simply are too many qualified individuals in this populous nation to doggedly insist that only one of them can do the job. Moreover, controversies of this sort only point to the obvious: the nominee is not the best choice because the effectiveness of any policy is to an important extent dependent on the effectiveness of the person expressing and representing that policy.

The President, however, has seen fit to insist upon his choice. That is his right. A majority of my colleagues apparently have concluded that Ambassador Adelman's claims to being an arms control advocate are insincere. That is their right. I have decided to accept Ambassador Adelman's representations that he will seek earnestly to achieve arms control agreements, notwithstanding interpretations of his previous writings and statements to the contrary.

Where does that leave us? It leaves us two and one-half years into an administration with no significant progress on arms control, no ACDA director, and no high administration official with any appreciable expertise in arms control. It also leaves us with our European allies restive, the Soviets in gear, and our nation soon facing the vagaries and distractions of an election year—a particularly inauspicious climate for concluding arms control agreements.

Whether liberal or conservative, hawk or dove, pro-freeze or anti-freeze, we ought all to agree that arms control is a paramount national interest, and we ought to get on with it. There should be no excuse for this Administration's failure to do so, and in any event, the Senate should not be responsible for giving them an excuse. Consequently, it is my recommendation that the Senate accede to the nomination of Ambassador Adelman, and that he and the President get us some results.

EDWARD ZORINSKY.



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